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Abstract: The significance of and interest in non-tariff measures (NTMs) have
increased as a consequence of the reduction in agricultural tariffs. This paper
analyses the relationship between NTMs and tariffs in southern Mediterranean
countries (SMCs) through two complementary analyses. First, the authors
construct a taxonomy of protection for products, distinguishing between high
protection, transparent protection, low protection and disguised protection. The low
protection category is most widely represented, and the disguised protection
category is also important. Second, the policy substitution hypothesis between tariff
and non-tariff protection is tested. This hypothesis appears in the literature as the
possibility that countries implement NTMs for protection purposes, as a result of
the progressive reduction in the tariffs levied. Policy substitution is found in some
SMCs, which is consistent with an upward trend of non-tariff protection as tariff
liberalization progresses in the region.
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As a result of the trade liberalization over the last few
decades, tariffs play a less important role in determining
agri-food trade flows. Therefore, more attention is being
paid to the role of non-tariff measures (NTMs) in both
academic research and the political arena. In fact, NTMs
are now among the main obstacles remaining in agri-food
trade, with legal coverage provided by the endorsement
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the provisions agreed in
bilateral arrangements. NTMs are employed for many
purposes, including the correction of information
asymmetries and market failures often related to food
safety concerns. When countries implement such meas-
ures, they are protecting values such as human, animal or
vegetal health, or consumers’ rights. However, they may
also have potential protectionist purposes, as they can be
used as a disguised protection aimed at restricting the
entry of foreign products (Hoekman and Nicita, 2008;
Nimenya et al, 2012). Fontagné et al (2005) reported that
the trade-distorting effects of NTMs were very relevant in
food trade; Disdier et al (2008) highlighted the fact that
their restrictive effects mostly took place in developing
countries’ exports.
In this respect, several authors (Copeland, 1990;
Ederington, 2001; Bagwell and Staiger, 2001) have
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suggested the policy substitution hypothesis: with the
agreed gradual tariff reduction, countries could imple-
ment NTMs in parallel as an alternative way of protecting
their domestic production. In a 2012 report by the WTO, a
comprehensive literature review was carried out, seeking
empirical evidence for this phenomenon. As this evidence
is mixed, the report states that ‘TBT measures may have
been used to take the place of tariffs, but there is very
limited evidence of substitution between tariffs and SPS
measures’ (WTO, 2012, p 71). Some studies in the USA
(Baylis et al, 2010) and EU (Jouanjean et al, 2012; Cadot et
al, 2012) also suggest that food alerts (a type of NTM) are
influenced by most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs. These
are the custom duties applied by WTO members to other
WTO members which do not benefit from preferential
treatment. In practice, applied MFN tariff rates reflect the
current usage of tariffs on third countries’ products.
Given this context, this paper focuses on the relation-
ship between tariffs and NTMs as protection tools in
selected southern Mediterranean countries (SMCs).
Specifically, we carry out an analysis that allows us to
ascertain whether or not NTMs implemented by SMCs are
dependent on tariffs and their evolution. Furthermore, we
have accounted for sectoral differences in the restrictive-
ness of NTMs. We initially examine the literature
concerning the effects of NTMs applied to agri-food trade
in the Mediterranean region and then explain the method-
ology used to carry out the analysis, including the likely
relationships between NTMs and tariffs. Finally, the
results of the analysis, the main findings and the implica-
tions are discussed.
Effects of NTMs in the Mediterranean region
After a thorough analysis of NTMs applied by Egypt and
Tunisia in all the sectors, Ghali et al (2013) identified that in
Tunisia agri-food products (from Harmonized System (HS)
sections I to IV) account for approximately 75% of NTMs,
while in Egypt the NTMs for the same product categories
represent less than 25%. Another difference highlighted
was that for all the sectors, Egypt’s NTMs belong predomi-
nantly to the TBT category, while Tunisia implements
mainly SPS measures. Recent evidence indicates that
various forms of NTM still play a trade-deterrent role in
Mediterranean agri-food trade. Chemingui and Dessus
(2008) highlighted the restrictiveness of quantitative
constraints applied by Syria. De Wulf et al (2009) stated that
the application of food standards by SMCs seemed to be
stricter at the borders than in domestic markets. Emlinger
(2010) analysed the ‘border effect’ which relates to the
access for SMC fruit and vegetables to EU markets, includ-
ing NTMs. Adopting a wider approach, Boulanger et al
(2013) used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
to simulate the impacts of a deep and comprehensive free
trade area (DCFTA) in the Mediterranean, using the Kee et
al (2009) estimates of non-tariff equivalents also used in this
study. Boulanger et al (2013) showed that the projected
trade increases after NTM reduction in the region were
several times greater than in the case of tariff elimination
only. With respect to this DCFTA framework, Gonzalez-
Mellado et al (2010) and Rau and Kavallari (2013) showed
that SMCs were at different stages of harmonization in
terms of their respective NTMs.
Methodology
The countries examined in this study include Egypt,
Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Algeria and Tunisia. With the
exception of Lebanon and Algeria, these are all members
of the WTO. All are part of the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership (EUROMED). Since 2004, Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco and Tunisia have been members of the Agadir
Agreement. This Agreement established a free trade area
amongst Arab Euro-Mediterranean countries and was
signed in Rabat on 25 February 2004 and then enforced on
6 July 2006. The Agreement aims to involve its members
in a process of trade liberalization that goes beyond the
multilateral agreements and also aims at harmonizing
general and sectoral economic policies in relation to
foreign trade. These countries, with the exception of
Algeria, are also members of the Greater Arab Free Trade
Area (GAFTA). Thus, they are involved in different stages
of the trade liberalization processes. The products include
the whole range of agri-food products at the 6-digit level
of the Harmonized System (referred to as HS, Chapters 01
to 22). Data on NTMs and tariffs were first combined to
allow for a description of the levels of protection provided
in the products and countries considered. Then an econo-
metric analysis was carried out to detect any relationships
between tariffs and NTMs.
Data on tariffs and non-tariff measures
We needed a measure of the protection level provided by 
NTMs. For this, we used the ad valorem equivalents of 
NTMs (hereinafter referred to as non-tariff equivalents, 
NTEs) estimated by Kee et al (2009). The particular inter-
est of this dataset is that it covers a wide range of 
products at the HS 6 level; note that the number of HS 
lines considered in this study includes 583 products; it 
provides ad valorem equivalents of NTMs that are directly 
comparable with tariffs, and it provides estimates of the 
restrictiveness of each NTM, irrespective of its nature. 
Obviously, these estimates are not free from limitations. 
Deardorff and Stern (1998), Dean et al (2003) and Vaughan 
(2005) underlined the problem of NTE computation when 
imported and domestic goods are not close substitutes. 
Kee et al (2009) and Nimenya et al (2012) accounted for 
imperfect substitution, as recently shown by Sanjuán 
López et al (2013), who suggested an alternative way of 
measuring NTEs based on gravity equations. With regard 
to tariffs, we gathered the MFN applied tariffs at the HS 6-
digit level from the World Integrated Trade Solution
(WITS) database, corresponding to the same period as the 
NTEs that were available, including a previous period to 
compute the variation of tariffs required to test the impact 
of tariff variations on NTE. WITS is an online data consul-
tation and extraction software. It contains import and 
export data from the United Nations COMTRADE data-
base and tariff rates and non-tariff barriers from the 
UNCTAD TRAINS database. Historical MFN tariffs data 
can be accessed through the Quick Search menu by 
selecting Tariff – View and Export Raw Data sub-menu. 
Users can download an MS Excel spreadsheet with all 
information (http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/).
Taxonomy of protection
We defined the level of protection by combining two
dimensions: first, whether it was low or high and, second,
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by indicating how transparent the protection was. We
consider that if NTEs and tariffs exceed a certain thresh-
old, protection can be considered high. To define the
threshold, we drew on the modalities document prepared
by the Committee of Agricultural Negotiations (WTO,
2008). For developing countries, it suggests that substan-
tial tariff reductions will be made for those products for
which the bound tariff or their ad valorem equivalent is
greater than 75%. Hence, we consider high protection via
tariffs when that threshold is overcome. We extended this
threshold to NTEs. On the other hand, the WTO considers
tariffs as transparent measures, whereas in general terms
NTMs are non-transparent protection measures. Thus four
categories of products were defined:
(1) high protection: products on which applied tariffs are
high (above 75%) and NTEs are greater than 75%;
(2) disguised protection: products on which tariffs are
less than 75% and NTEs are over 75%;
(3) low protection: products on which tariffs are less than
75% and NTEs are below 75%, and;
(4) transparent protection: products on which tariffs are
greater than 75% and NTEs are below 75%.
Do applied NTMs depend on tariffs?
While the previous analysis can provide insights into the
relationships between NTMs and tariffs, a multiple
regression analysis allows us to test policy substitution
statistically. In other words, are NTEs statistically depend-
ent on the tariffs levied? If that is the case, then what is
the strength of that relationship? Equation (1) illustrates
the general model in which the NTMs are dependent on
tariffs and their evolution:
NTM = F(tariffs, Δtariffs) (1)
The existence of policy substitution will be indicated by
the sign of the first derivatives:
∂NTM———— (2)
∂tariff
In this case, static policy substitution is suggested when
Equation (2) < 0, as the higher the tariff, the less restrictive
the NTM (and vice versa). With regard to Equation (2) > 0,
this suggests ‘policy complementarity’ as there are possi-
ble underlying political and economic reasons, implying
that both tariff and non-tariff protection tend to move in
the same direction. Also, dynamic policy substitution
could take place, considering the influence of previous
tariff changes on current NTMs:
∂NTM———— (3)
∂Δtariff
If Equation (3) < 0, this shows that restrictive NTMs are
connected to decreasing tariffs in the previous period,
indicating dynamic policy substitution. Dynamic
complementarity appears when high NTMs result from
previous tariff increases. To test the existence of policy
substitution, the multiple regression model in equation (4)
was estimated:
lnNTE = α + β1lnT + β2ΔlnT + Σδj Zj  + Σσj Zj lnT (4)
+ Σρj ZjΔlnT + Σγmƒm + u
where lnNTE is the natural logarithm of ad valorem
equivalents of the NTMs, lnT is the natural logarithm of
the tariffs, which are calculated as a simple average for
the products included under each 6-digit heading. With Δ,
we refer to the five-year differences between the loga-
rithms of the tariffs, where the final year is the year for
which the NTEs were available. Specific product effects Zj
are represented through dummies that correspond to the
fixed effects for groups of products to capture product
specificities, following the suggestion by Dean et al (2009).
These groups are defined as belonging to Section I (Live
animals and animal products), HS chapters 01 to 05 (j = 1),
and Section II (Vegetal products), HS chapters 06 to 14
(j = 2). So, the expression Σσj Zj lnT is used to estimate the
static policy substitution by sector and the expression
Σρj ZjΔlnT is used to estimate the dynamic policy substitu-
tion by sector over a five-year period. ƒm is a set of
dummy variables equal to 1 when the product belongs to
the HS chapter m, and 0 otherwise, where m = 1 to m = 21
are the trade chapters (HS, 2 digits). Finally, u is the error
term.
Apart from the dynamic substitution, it should be
noted that considering the tariff variation allows us to
deal with the endogeneity between tariffs and NTEs; in
any case, we believe that endogeneity is not likely to take
place as the evolution of tariffs is largely exogenous and
mostly determined by previous multilateral political
commitments and schedules.
Results and discussion
Depicting trade protection in SMCs
We first show the overall picture of agricultural protec-
tion. Table 1 depicts the simple average NTEs and the
evolution of applied MFN tariffs between 1998 and 2003.
These data show the relatively high level of agricultural
protection in the selected SMCs. As Table 1 indicates, the
evolution of applied tariffs is not the same across every
country. Morocco and Tunisia increased their tariffs at the
beginning of the century, and then lowered them in the
following years. Egypt and Lebanon showed opposite
trends, while Jordan and Algeria, with low initial levels,
reduced many tariffs over time. Average NTEs calculated
by Kee et al (2009) were about 50% for most countries,
with the lowest level in Morocco. A similar pattern of
changes in tariffs can be seen when considering specific
sections. Table 2 shows the percentage of tariff lines with
Table 1. NTEs and change in agricultural tariffs for selected
SMCs.
MFN applied tariffs, Non-tariff equivalents,
simple average (%) simple average (%)a
1995–99 2000–04 2005–08 2003–04
Egypt 65.8 45.0 66.5 48.7
Lebanon 11.8 17.1 19.1 50.7
Jordan – 21.9 19.0 50.0
Morocco 43.0 50.8 44.5 38.6
Tunisia 34.6 71.5 56.3 55.5
Algeria 28.0 23.9 23.2 56.5
Sources: World Bank, World Trade Indicators 2009/10; aauthors’
calculations from Kee et al (2009).
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Table 2. Percentage of tariff lines with positive and negative variations in applied MFN tariffs between 1998 and 2003 (HS 6 digits).
Section I: Animal products Section II: Vegetable products Sections III and IV: Fats and
(Chapters 1 to 5) (Chapters 6 to 14) oils, and prepared foodstuffs
(Chapters 15 to 22)
> 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
Egypt 3.95 53.95 11.31 79.19 21.89 77.51
Lebanon 28.66 28.66 38.77 53.30 30.91 52.12
Jordan 0.00 43.28 0.00 11.11 12.50 87.50
Morocco 79.55 19.32 90.72 5.49 83.33 16.67
Tunisia 40.49 1.84 52.67 11.33 51.53 12.27
Algeria 15.38 78.11 27.04 50.21 18.75 71.02
Sources: WITS and authors’ calculations.
Table 3. Taxonomy of agricultural trade protection (%).
Category of protection Egypt Jordan Morocco Tunisia Lebanon Algeria
High 1 0 2 9 0 0
Disguised 26 4 21 19 27 36
Low 71 95 71 48 71 64
Transparent 1 2 5 25 2 0
Sources: WITS and authors’ calculations.
positive and negative variations in applied MFN tariffs
between 1998 and 2003. As mentioned above, Morocco
and Tunisia present the greater percentage of positive
tariff variations, in contrast to the other four SMCs.
However, considering that for all studied countries the
low protection category is the most represented (Table 3),
we could conclude that Morocco and Tunisia had very
low protection levels at the beginning of the period. Table
3 shows the taxonomy of protection. Apart from the
relevance of the low protection level in every country, the
disguised protection is also noticeable in all countries. In
addition, Tunisia can be mentioned as the country with
highest percentage of tariffs in the transparent category
(25%).
Policy substitution between NTMs and tariffs
Table 4 summarizes the model results testing the hypoth-
esis of policy substitution. For each country, estimated
coefficients and standard errors are shown for the ex-
planatory variables, in which the sign of significant
coefficients reveals the possible appearance of policy
substitution. For Egypt, the main significant relationship
between NTEs and tariffs takes place for vegetable prod-
ucts, with dynamic policy substitution taking place in HS
Section II. As shown above, MFN tariffs were mainly
reduced for these goods in the years before this study,
which implied an upward pressure on NTMs. This hap-
pened in spite of the fact that the fixed effect coefficient
for Section II products indicates a lesser level of NTEs
than the other sections. Dynamic policy substitution in
vegetable products is consistent with the relatively high
count of disguised protection in the country (26% in Table
3). Dairy products showed a positive coefficient indicating
higher NTEs than in the other products. For Lebanon,
neither policy substitution nor complementarity between
tariffs and NTMs was detected. Several positive fixed
effects are significant for specific sectors, notably dairy
products and preparations of vegetables, and negative for
Section II products. In Jordan, no significant relationships
were found. In all cases, we considered statistical signifi-
cance at the 5% threshold. The lack of results in the Jordan
case could be related to the limited availability of data to
carry out the regression analyses.
For Morocco, both static and dynamic policy substitu-
tion appear in Section I products. The dynamic policy
substitution, together with the fact that Section I products’
tariffs were mostly raised, indicates that NTMs have
become less stringent, though they remain significant, as
shown by the positive fixed effects estimated for Section I
products. Preparations of vegetables (Chapter 20) also
have a higher NTE level. In Tunisia, dynamic policy
substitution occurs in Section II products. For these
products, tariffs were mostly lowered, which indicates
more restrictive NTMs in general. Likewise for the other
countries analysed, significant and positive fixed effects
took place for dairy products and preparations of vegeta-
bles. In Algeria, dynamic policy substitution also
occurred, in this case for all the products. In addition,
dairy products had significant and positive fixed effects.
Concluding remarks
Studies on trade policy reform frequently refer to the
policy substitution hypothesis, which stems from a simple
observation on the trends towards lower tariff values and
enhanced NTMs (Hoekman and Nicita, 2008). Explicit
tests of such relations are not conclusive in the literature.
In this paper we tested this hypothesis based on the NTEs
estimated by Kee et al (2009) and observed levels and
changes in MFN tariff values in SMCs. Our results suggest
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Table 4. Model results: non-tariff equivalents (NTEs) of non-tariff measures (NTMs) as a function of tariffs, tariff evolution and sector,
for selected SMCs.
Egypt Lebanon Jordan Morocco Tunisia Algeria
ln tariff
General –0.050639 –0.35524 2.5739 0.637331 0.12510 –0.16965
β1lnT (0.054263) (0.26371) (1.6300) (0.324829) (0.27916) (0.49464)
Animal products –0.489631 0.62568 –3.2506 –0.692212** 0.01239 0.12841
(Chapters 1 to 5) (0.333822) (0.65878) (1.6688) (0.342265) (0.1420) (0.69957)
σjZjlnT
Vegetable products 0.510772 0.54992 –4.1088 –0.310980 0.32710 0.87383
(Chapters 6 to 14) (0.310360) (0.43914) (3.2481) (0.375064) (0.15813) (0.55053)
σjZjlnT
Δln tariff
General 0.180000 0.20790 –0.1605 –0.023661 0.22204 –0.71928**
β2ΔlnT (0.196469) (0.21235) (1.4900) (0.126876) (0.33576) (0.31467)
Animal products 0.037064 –0.38927 1.1539 –1.061362** –0.23213 0.90641
(Chapters 1 to 5) (0.324016) (0.59485) (1.7184) (0.494023) (0.26790) (0.46613)
ρjZjΔlnT
Vegetable products –0.861594*** –0.08102 NA –0.234740 –0.84939*** 0.78359
(Chapters 6 to 14) (0.327645) (0.50644) (0.350363) (0.28039) (0.41675)
ρjZjΔlnT
Fixed effects ƒ4 0.162762
** ƒ4 0.20192
** ƒ4 0.2201 ƒ20 0.215844
*** ƒ4 0.27491
*** ƒ4 0.18912
**
for HS chapters Z1 0.007668 ƒ20 0.16415
** Z1 0.5937 Z10.389869
*** ƒ20 0.16094
** Z1 –0.04250
ƒm and δjZj  Z2 –0.174813***  Z1 –0.12191 Z2 0.3555   Z2 0.159060 Z2 –0.24320
Z2 –0.11838
**
Number of observations 532 545 75 583 467 568
p-value 0.04936 0.01045 0.01611 0.00005 0.00001 0.000105
Notes: ***, ** indicate significance at 1% and 5% respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. The coefficients of non-significant fixed
effects are omitted for reasons of space. = Section I (Animal products);  : Section 2 (Vegetable products);4 = Dairy products; 20 = Prepara-
tions of vegetables.
that NTMs substitute tariffs in four countries of the
sample. Regarding how this phenomenon affects coun-
tries and sectors, some key points are: first, in the
countries where policy substitution appears, it does so in
a dynamic way. Static substitution is only significant for
vegetable products in Morocco. This indicates that the
restrictiveness of NTMs is influenced by the evolution of
tariffs rather than by their current level. Second, coun-
tries seem to target specific groups of products when
applied tariffs have been declining in favour of NTMs:
only in Algeria is dynamic policy substitution accepted
as applied to all the HS agricultural sections, while
substitution is observed in Egypt and Tunisia only in
vegetable products and in Morocco only in animal
products. Therefore, we have detected different behav-
iour concerning policy substitution, which may respond
to domestic sector determinants. A third conclusion is
that policy substitution depends on the trade liberaliza-
tion approach chosen by each country. Morocco and
Tunisia mainly raised the applied MFN tariffs in the
years before signing the Agadir Agreement, and hence
then lowered the restrictiveness of their NTMs. As tariffs
are the most transparent protection measure, it can be
concluded that they were following the WTO philosophy
of transparency and predictability in trade policies. In
the same period, Egypt lowered tariffs and then raised
the restrictiveness of its NTMs. Other findings from our
analysis indicate that dairy products and, to a lesser
extent, preparations of vegetables, have more restrictive
NTMs compared with other products. The analysis of
factors explaining these facts would require a case-by-
case assessment.
In spite of these results suggesting the possibility of
policy substitution, there is a need for further evidence
in order to define a general trend in developing econo-
mies, as our results contrast with opposing evidence in
developed economies (see Baylis et al, 2010; and
Jouanjean et al, 2012). An updated estimation of NTEs for
SMCs could help confirm whether or not the substitution
hypothesis is consistent. Moreover, it should be noted
that the substitution effects are tested between multilat-
eral NTEs and MFN tariffs. Taking into account the
specific changes related to the bilateral relationship
emerging from the association process between the EU
and the Mediterranean countries would require a de-
tailed analysis of the preferential tariffs, which is beyond
the general trends identified in this paper. If policy
substitution were confirmed in further research, trade
liberalization in the Mediterranean region would imply
increasing pressures on NTMs. As the literature has
indicated, the lack of harmonization in the region ham-
pers trade; hence, departing from multilateral protection
and making progress at the regional level, and the
creation of a DCFTA in the Mediterranean region should
place emphasis on attempting to even up the restrictive-
ness of NTMs.
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